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In most cases external forces and trends have influenced this often complex post conflict period. In the post Vietnam era the United States Army was fraught with
problems. These problems were the direct result of its involvement in an exhausting, unpopular, protracted conflict half a world away. A familiar depiction of that era, from within its own ranks, described the Army as 'hollow'. It is a tribute to the leaders during the post Vietnam era who took these problems head on and raised our Army to a level not thought possible.
Although currently engaged on two fronts of war, the Army will emerge from these unprecedented times to once again reset and refit on the road to preparing for the nation's next conflict.
This paper examines the key challenges the United States leaders will face in the not so distant future and makes recommendations for our leaders to consider in order to prepare our Army for follow on missions.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A POST CONFLICT UNITED STATES ARMY
It is safe to say that in the not so distant future the United States military will have less of an influence and certainly less of a presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. The number of troops on the ground in Iraq will decrease to roughly 50,000 by the end of especially the Army, struggled with indiscipline, cases of substance abuse and a lack of direction. At this lowest of low points in our history, however, the force proved resilient again, learned lessons and got better than ever before.
My task in this paper is twofold. First, to look at the post Vietnam period through the eyes of those who experienced it; in most cases through the eyes of the leaders that decided as young field grade officers that a career in the military was still viable and worthy of pursuit and who maintained the hope that the force would rebound yet again.
Secondly, I will attempt to look to the future of the force that remains engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan today. Lastly I will conclude with some recommendations to build a foundation for the next chapter in our history.
Post Vietnam Era
The Seen through the eyes of those that served at this time, Tet was a major tactical victory.
Another interpretation of the effect of the Tet offensive reads as follows:
U.S. leadership in Saigon saw Tet as the destruction of the VC infrastructure that had taken Hanoi decades to build, which made it a victory. Washington saw it as armed enemy troops raising hell throughout Vietnam, including the halls and offices of the American Embassy in Saigon, which made it a defeat. Abrams' strength as a strategic leader. Given the latitude to be critical and up front with peers and seniors alike, Dupuy developed the plan to get the Army back on track once again. As General Starry assumed command of TRADOC from Dupuy, the plan was executed violently and thus the Army had found itself once again.
General Dupuy was a highly regarded U.S. Army Lieutenant General when he was brought to the Army staff by General Westmoreland. Gole, in his biography of Dupuy, describes the select few that Westmoreland brought on the team.
By the late 1960's, they had risen to the top of the Army hierarchy, where they found themselves the custodians of a broken institution that they were determined to fix. proper respect and collaboration from the civilian side". 20 Gole goes on to describe Dupuy "as a general who got it…He was as bright as any of the Whiz kids, the young civilian managers Robert McNamara brought to government". The generals, and all thinking officers, were deeply concerned with the many problems the Army faced as it came out of Vietnam. Depuy's reorganization plans honored General Westmoreland's pledge to revivify the Army, but Westmoreland would leave decision and implementation to his successor, Creighton Abrams. He didn't want to saddle Abrams with a setup he couldn't live with. Second, our company grade leaders and noncommissioned officers have been given a pass on some elementary tasks that are thoroughly learned in schools and practiced in a garrison environment. An example is the Army's stringent property accountability procedures. These mundane yet necessary tasks reinforce the banner of our leaders as good stewards of government property. All too often in combat, these skills are either not learned or certainly not practiced by our junior leaders. This is not to say that negligent practices are excuses for poor accountability. Rather, the demands of combat force leaders to prioritize life saving task ahead of others.
Third, the training of our battalion and brigade commanders prior to assuming command is woefully inadequate and in need of revamping. This pre command training is outdated and needs to more accurately reflect the challenges of the force today. This is a force that will continue to deal with repeated deployments for the foreseeable future.
Commanders at the battalion and brigade level need to understand this facet of command more thoroughly. This is vital, as I believe the task of mentoring our junior leaders, when in command, is a critical task now more than ever before.
In a recent letter from General Dempsey, the current TRADOC Commander offers the following on the state of Army training, "We are behind in integrating lessons learned, developing training and updating doctrine. We are undermanned in our efforts to design the future Army." 26 
Recommendations
Current requirements for the force will not wane in the near future. The demands of repeated and extended deployments will continue for most of the operational force.
However, the responsibility and the requirements to build and maintain a well trained and ready force for the future must be met. It is paramount to understand that our focus will have to change from how to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan to preparing for the future enemy. How we train and resource the force is critical but the lynch pin is leadership.
The following remedies are not meant as a checklist rather a primer on how we focus our future leaders. This is a microcosm of the problem that needs acknowledgment and must be fixed.
Second, our senior leaders need to be senior mentors in a more robust way not only to our junior leaders in the force but at the source of commissioning. The cadets across the country need more contact from our senior leaders and to be told what is expected of them in the future. This cannot be isolated to a graduation speech.
Leadership has to be a contact sport! Not all will make the cut. This is the brutal reality of any business. The right people need to advance not based on how much time they have spent in contact but their qualities as leaders. General Dupuy said, Just as the state of training in a line unit should be judged by troop performance, and not by the amount of time spent in training, so any commander should be judged by his results in accomplishing mission, and not by his source of commission or the number and level of Army schools he attended. 27 The future of the force lies in the hands of our junior leaders. These problems are theirs to wrestle and overcome. The history of our Army is filled with examples of learning and relearning lessons. General Starry draws an analogy between the strength of our force and the country.
Our country, like countries of the past, will decline in strength and could eventually fall unless we take care to prepare young leaders to acquire competence, develop the commitment, practice the candor, and have the courage to continue this nation's efforts to fulfill its inherent goals. 28 I believe it is time for our senior leaders to begin the much needed debate and exchange on the future of the Army Enterprise. With sleeves rolled up the force needs to be analyzed in the context of new missions, a reduction in resources, and an upfront, honest analysis of a training base that needs to be overhauled. Veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan and their experience are important to this exchange but most crucial to this dialogue are the naysayers and the pundits that have contrary views to the norm. In the coming years the force needs to refocus and history is on its side.
